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REPLY TO HERNANDEZ'S ARGUMENTS
L

HERNANDEZ ARGUES FOR A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE STANDARD
THAT IGNORES CLEARLY ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT.
It should be noted as a preliminary matter, that Hernandez does not dispute that

where, as here, a trial court considers the issue of a meritorious defense without
specifically ruling on the question of whether there was a sufficient excuse under Rule
60(b), the existence of a sufficient excuse is implied. Thus, Hernandez has conceded that
because the trial court specifically ruled on the issue of Baker's meritorious defenses,
Baker has satisfied the excuse and timeliness prongs of Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Therefore,
the only question is whether Baker presented a meritorious defense as a matter of law.
Addressing this issue in Points I and II of his brief, Hernandez asks this Court to
apply a meritorious defense standard that ignores clearly established precedent.
Hernandez asserts that Erickson v. Schenkers Infl Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah
1994), Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 P.3d 277, and State ex. rel. Dep't of Social
Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983) provide a standard under which
"undisputed material" facts supporting a judgment render a defense unmeritorious. (Br.
at 11.) In essence, he argues the standard for a meritorious defense should be the same as
a motion for summary judgment. (Br. at 16.) He further asserts that courts should "look
outside the pleadings" to make this determination. (Br. at 16.) l

1

Curiously, Hernandez mentions at lease twice that Baker did not file a "verified answer" to his
verified complaint. (Br. at 5,17.) The undersigned is unaware of any requirement in the rules of
civil procedure o r elsewhere—and Hernandez fails to point to any—that requires a "verified answer"
be made in response to a "verified complaint."

1

His assertions are erroneous. First and foremost, Hernandez fails to cite a single
authority, and the undersigned is unaware of any, in which the court has held that a
motion to set aside should be analyzed in the same manner as a motion for summary
judgment. Second, Hernandez asks this Court to weigh the evidence and decide the
merits of the case. This is not the meritorious defense standard.
Rather, the case law is clear, to show a meritorious defense, the law merely
requires a simple determination of whether the defenses proffered, if proven at trial,
would preclude recovery on the claims asserted by the plaintiff. See Lund, 2000 UT 75
atffif28-29;Erickson. 882 P.2d at 1148. This is so regardless of whether the defenses are
proffered in the form of general denials or more specific affirmative defenses. See
Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149 & n.L Baker's opening brief goes through the allegations in
the verified complaint one by one, and for each, points out a meritorious defense that, if
shown, would preclude recovery at trial. (Appellants' Br. at 13-17.)
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has "made it clear that a party need not
actually prove its proposed defenses to meet [the meritorious defense] standard." Lund,
2000 UT 75 at ^29. Whether or not Baker can ultimately prevail on his defenses is an
issue for a trial on the merits; not for determining whether the defense is meritorious.
Thus, it is improper for Hernandez to ask this Court to decide the merits of the underlying
case, and Hernandez's attempt to get this Court to view the letter from Baker's previous
attorney as the smoking gun evidence and, in essence, conduct its own evidentiaiy
hearing is inappropriate and unsupported by law.
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Furthermore, Hernandez's invitation to this Court to "look outside the pleadings'5
is contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's admonition to look only at the pleadings. See
Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1148 (holding "the Court should only examine the defendant's
proposed answer and determine whether as a matter of law it contains a defense which is
entitled to be tried." (quoting Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1058 (Howe, J.5 concurring)).
Moreover, Hernandez's argument that "pleading practice [will be pushed] into
ethically shady areas where good will becomes lost in the murk[]" (Br. a t 19-20) by
allowing general denials to stand as meritorious defenses not only ignores clearly
established supreme court precedent, it also ignores Rule 11. See Utah R . Civ. P.
11(b)(2) (stating: "By presenting a pleading . . . an attorney . . . is certifying that... the
claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law"). It is Rule 11, not the meritorious defense standard, which is
meant to prevent any foray into dark places.
In sum, Baker has a meritorious defense. Hernandez has not shown otherwise.

II.

HERNANDEZ'S SECTION ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD BE
IGNORED.
Hernandez spends considerable time attempting to justify the trial court's

imposition of punitive damages. Baker has set forth a meritorious defense to the same.
(Appellants' Br. at 16-17.) On appeal of a Rule 60(b) order, the appellate court is not
concerned with nor does it reach the merits of the underlying judgment. See Franklin
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Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, f 19, 2 P.3d 451 (stating "appeal
of a Rule 60(b) order addresses only the propriety of the denial or grant of relief[, it] does
n o t . . . reach the merits of the underlying judgment from which relief i s sought/9). Thus,
whether or not punitive damages were justified in the trial court's underlying judgment is
immaterial to this appeal.
Therefore, Point III of Hernandez's brief should simply be ignored.

III.

HERNANDEZ'S ATTEMPT TO EVADE HIS FAILURE T O SIMPLY FILE
HIS AMENDED COMPLAINT IS UNAVAILING.
Hernandez makes several arguments in support of this Court upholding the

judgment against Performance Auto. However, for the reasons set forth below, his
arguments are inapposite and unavailing.
First, several issues regarding the "facts" Hernandez relies on must be dealt with.
Hernandez asserts that,
little would have been accomplished by attempting to go through the
motions of serving a summons on the Corporation since Baker, the
registered agent, could not be found at the registered office of t h e
corporation. By the time Baker was served with a summons for a second
time in this litigation, months before the Corporation was joined as party,
Performance was no longer doing business as the address listed for the
corporation's registered agent and Baker could not be found there.
(Br. at 25.)
Aside from the absurd notion that the rules of civil procedure should be
disregarded, Hernandez fails to cite anywhere in the record which supports such factual
contentions. As a result, it should be stricken or otherwise ignored by this Court in
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considering the instant appeal. See Wilderness Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d
766, 768 (Utah 1985) (stating appellate review "is of course limited to t h e evidence
contained in the record on appeal").
In addition, Hernandez argues that his amended complaint was "mysteriously not
filed" (Br. at 28) and that Hernandez's counsel "submitted a '[Proposed] Amended
Complaint' with motion to amend and mailed the same to Baker's counsel." (Br. at 5.)
As noted in Appellants' Brief and undisputed by Hernandez, the proposed amended
complaint appears nowhere in the record. Hernandez's attempt to infer t h a t it was ever
placed before the trial court or mailed to Baker or Performance Auto's attorney should be
disregarded by this Court.
Second, Hernandez's attempt to get this Court to adopt some type o f notice test in
relation to whether a judgment can stand against a defendant would make bad law and
policy. This type of test would require courts in this state to spend valuable time
weighing evidence concerning notice and whether, under the circumstances of each case,
it would make sense to require a plaintiff to try to serve a particular defendant; all of this,
simply because the plaintiff failed to file his amended complaint.
The better rule is simply to require a plaintiff who obtains leave t o amend his
complaint to actually file the same. This bright line rule avoids any evidentiary
requirements and places the burden squarely where it should be—on t h e plaintiff.
Third, as noted in Appellants' Brief (Appellants' Br. at 19 n.8), a n y claim of
actual notice in lieu of proper service is moot if a complaint is never actually filed. Rule
3(a) of the Utah Rules of Procedure provides that an action must be dismissed if a
5

complaint is not filed within ten days of service. See Utah R. Civ. P. 3(a) (stating, "If, in
a case commenced [by service of a summons and copy of complaint], the complaint,
summons and proof of service are not filed within ten days of service, the action
commenced shall be deemed dismissed and the court shall have no further jurisdiction
thereof." (emphasis added)). Here, it is undisputed that the amended complaint was not
filed, thereby necessarily rendering service of process moot.
Fourth, Hernandez fails to cite a single authority that stands for the proposition
that actual notice of litigation is a substitute for filing the complaint on which that
litigation is based.
Fifth, Hernandez's assertion that this case falls within the category of a "nonprejudicial misnomer" is without merit. In Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367
(Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court addressed a "mistake" wherein t h e plaintiff
erroneously named "Geneva Rock Corp." as the defendant rather than "Geneva Rock
Products, Inc." IdL at 368. The supreme court held that in such a circumstance leave
should have been given to the plaintiffs to amend the complaint. See id. at 370.
In the instant case, there was never an error or mistake as to the name of the
defendant. Rather, this case clearly involved two different defendants: Baker,
individually, and Performance Auto, the corporation. Liability was sought against both,
and judgment obtained against both. There was simply no "misnomer" here. Wilcox
does not apply.
Furthermore, the cases cited by Hernandez regarding the relation back of
amendments involve Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b) and issues concerning limitations of actions
6

and the point in time when an additional defendant must be served. See Valley Asphalt,
Inc. v. Stubbs, 714 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah 1986) (addressing timing of service on
additional defendant and Rule 4(b)). Performance Auto has never asserted that
Hernandez's motion to amend was too late in time or that it could not have been served at
all. The issue is the absolute failure to serve and file the amended complaint as a
jurisdictional prerequisite. Moreover, Rule 4(b) addresses service "at any time prior to
trial"; it does not provide and has never been construed to mean that judgment may be
obtained against an additional defendant on mere actual notice where the complaint on
which the judgment is based does not even appear of record.
Finally, Hernandez's conclusory attempts to distinguish the cases relied upon by
Performance Auto are unavailing. As set forth in Appellants' Brief, those cases are
determinative and instructive to a resolution of this issue. Hernandez fails to show
otherwise.
In sum, had Hernandez merely served and filed the amended complaint, there
would not be a jurisdictional issue. This Court should not relieve him f r o m his failure to
consummate such fundamental procedures at the expense of Performance Auto.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons set forth in Appellants' Brief,
Appellants request the trial court be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this M """day of April 2004.
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